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From the day this case first went to court, Appellant 
William Andrews has sought one thing: the opportunity for a 
full hearing in which he could present argument and evidence 
showing the sentence of death he is under was imposed in 
violation of his constitutional rights.l He has still not 
had that hearing. This Court's decision upholds the denial of 
that hearing, but at the same time reaches what the Court 
construes as the merits of his claims, and finds his sentence 
valid. Appellant respectfully submits that, because no full 
hearing on these issues has been granted, the Court has 
misconstrued his claims and erroneously decided the issues his 
Petition raises, in the following particulars. 
1 At page 7 of the Court's opinion, it says that •the 
hearing on the motion to dismiss the petition proceded without 
objection or request for continuance." With all respect, 
Appellant submits that through this entire proceeding this 
Petitioner has been requesting a continuance. The transcript 
of the hearing below makes it absolutely clear that it was 
Petitioner's position opposing the dismissal motion below that 
the merits of the issues in the Petitions could not properly be 
considered without further hearings and briefing, see 
Transcript 11/30/78 at 26-27, 29, and that has been his 
position ever since, see App. Br. 1-2. 
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1. The Court's summary rejection of Appellant's claims 
relative to the unconstitutionality of the Utah Death Penalty 
Statutes applied in this case fails to address all the concerns 
of Appellant's Petition and is inconsistent with the Court's 
recent decision in State v. Brown. 
Appellant's Petition in this case pointed to several 
aspects of the Utah Death Penalty Statutes under which sentence 
was imposed in his case which rendered those statutes 
constitutionally deficient under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972), and Supreme Court cases subsequent to it. See 
Petition, page 4. The Petition pointed out that sentencing 
juries have "unguided and unfettered discretion to choose which 
capitally convicted defendants will be sentenced to death," 
without making any findings after conviction and without saying 
more in their verdict than "the defendant is sentenced to 
death"--the single declaration on which Petitioner's death 
sentence rests. See Petition, page 4; Verdict Forms, 
(Petition, Appendix G). It pointed out that aggravating 
circumstances, even as elements of first degree murder, were 
not required to be pleaded by the State, found unanimously by 
the jury, or anywhere specified in the verdicts. Petition, 
page 5. It alleged that evidence of "aggravating" factors 
other than those statutorily specified were admitted at the 
sentencing proceeding, that the prosecution argued for the 
imposition of death for reasons outside the statute, and that 
no limitations were placed on the evidence admissible at the 
sentencing phase. Id. at 5-6, It pointed out that no 
-2-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
standards were given the jury by which to make findings, or 
weigh the factors it found, other than a general instruction 
that the State bore the burden of showing that the death 
penalty was •appropriate.• Id. at 6-7. And it claimed that, on 
such a record, this Court's review could not provide any 
safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice. Id. at 8-9. 
This Court's opinion addresses only a few aspects of 
these issues. It holds the statutory list of •aggravating 
circumstances" sufficient to give notice in any particular 
case: it rejects any requirement of additional written findings 
supporting a sentence of death, after a guilty verdict, though 
such findings have been required by all statutes upheld by the 
Supreme Court to date (see App.Br at 18): and it apparently 
assumes that the requirements of Presnell v. Georgia, 439 u.s. 
14 (1978) can be met without the appellate court knowing what 
aggravating circumstance the jury found proven in a given case. 
Opinion, pages 8-12. But it nowhere addresses Petitioner's 
further claims, and reaffirms its upholding of the Utah 
Statutes without mentioning them. 
The Utah procedures followed here much more closely 
resemble those of the statutes held unconstitutional in Furman 
than those upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 167 (1976) and 
its companion cases. In none of the statutes upheld to date 
has there been the totally unlimited range of sentencing 
considerations, aggravating or mitigating, Utah's statutes 
-3-
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allow--so that in this case the jury could have sentenced 
Petitioner to death for any reason, not just those listed as 
aggravating factors. In none of them has there been the total 
lack of restrictions on sentencing evidence there is under this 
State's law--so that in this case not even constitutional 
evidentiary limitations were observed, and no prehearing notice 
of evidence required so that the prosecution's claims could be 
fully confronted and tested. Cf. Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 
694 (5th Cir. 1979). In none of the laws upheld to date has 
the jury been allowed to choose any convicted murderer for 
either life or death, without even saying why--as the jury was 
here. And in none have the jurors been given so little 
guiqance as they were here in finding the relevant sentencing 
facts and weighing them--so that in this case life and death 
depended only on what the jury found •appropriate.• 
This Court's recent opinion in State v. Brown, No. 15481 
(February 7, 1980), seems to recognize the constitutional 
considerations which the recent capital cases have established, 
and to have applied them to do two things: to require that 
•scrupulous care must particularly extend to evidence 
introduced by the State in the penalty phase• of a capital 
case, and to reiterate and enforce its dictum that the jury 
must be instructed that ••the totality of evidence of 
aggravating circumstances must • • • outweigh the totality of 
mitigating circumstances.•• State v. Brown, at 14, quoting 
-4-
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State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1348 (Utah 1977). Yet in this 
case the very deficiencies Brown turned on were present, in 
addition to those others listed above. In this case evidence 
was admitted at the sentencing phase which had nothing to do 
with any aggravating circumstance--evidence of penological 
theory and religious opinion (T. 4197-4246), evidence of the 
defendant's mental status and work performance (T. 4134-4163), 
evidence which included hearsay on hearsay (see, e.g. T. 4142-8) 
and which was often factually inaccurate (T. 4167). And here, 
too, the jury was never told it had to find that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances to impose 
death; instead, it was instructed that "[t)here is no fixed 
standard as to the degree of persuasion needed for a particular 
sentence" though "the burden of proof to satisfy the jury that a 
death sentence is appropriate is on the State." Sent. Inst. 2. 
The continued affirmance of the proceedings in this case 
is inconsistent with the holding of Brown, and the statutes 
which permit such undirected proceedings as these are 
irreconcilable with the requirements the Supreme Court has 
imposed. Though this Court may be able, by interpretation, to 
construe the Utah Death Penalty laws in a way that confines jury 
discretion, limits the scope of aggravation, and imposes a 
constitutionally tolerable burden of proof on the State, it 
cannot change the fact that such procedures were not followed in 
this case, and that the failure to follow them violates the 
constitution. 
-5-
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2. The Court's rejection of Petitioner's claim that his 
death sentence is unconstitutional because he was not proven or 
found to have intended the deaths of the victims misconstrues 
the record in this case. 
One of the claims in this appeal was that the District 
Court improperly dismissed the Petition here without the 
transcript of the case before it. See App. Br. 11. This claim 
was partly mooted by the Court's examination of the record, and 
the stipulation of the parties that the record was available. 
But the difficulties of assessing the record without a full 
hearing on it are nonetheless apparent from the Court's 
decision: for the Court's opinions contain significant 
misstatements about the facts of this case, Petitioner Andrews' 
role in it and the findings about it the jury was required to 
make. 
The court's statement that "[t]he record in this case 
reveals the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances 
and discloses that the evidence in mitigation was virtually 
nonexistent," Opinion, page 10, exemplifies this 
misunderstanding. Neither half of this statement is accurate 
as to Petitioner William Andrews. The record reveals that at 
least three of the aggravating circumstances on which the jury 
was charged were wholly without evidentiary basis as to this 
Petitioner, and that there was undisputed evidence in 
-6-
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support for at least four of the six statutorily listed 
mitigating circumstances. William Andrews undisputedly did not 
cause the deaths of any of the victims; there was no evidence 
he created a •great risk• to their lives; there was no evidence 
he knew of or participated in any rape. See below. His 
criminal record was far from "signficant,• involving one minor 
theft conviction (T. 4255); his alleged involvement in the 
crime was plainly "under duress or substantial domination of 
another;" he was a "youth," aged 19 at the time of the crime 
(T. 4248); and the worst allegations against him made him •a 
party to the murder committed by another person and • his 
particpation was relatively minor •••• • See U.C.A. 1953 
76-3-207. 
The Court's misinterpretation of these facts has its 
greatest significance in its rejection of Petitioner's argument 
that his death sentence is constitutionally disproportionate to 
his level of involvement in the offense here. The Court flatly 
rejects Petitioner's claim, saying "Andrews was an active 
participant in the acts of torture• and contrasting that to 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 u.s. 586 (1978) where the Court says the 
defendant was merely "the 'wheelman' in a robbery which resulted 
in a murder." Opinion, page 11. 
In fact, the sole evidence of Petitioner Andrews' 
participation in any of the acts which injured the victims here 
was Mr. Oren Walker's testimony that, at one point Andrews 
-7-
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picked up a container and poured a caustic liquid into a cup 
Pierre was holding. T. 3077, Mr. Walker testified clearly it 
was Pierre who forced each of the victims in turn to drink from 
the cup. T. 3084-5. Though Mr. Walker thought the cup was 
refilled by Andrews, all he could actually see was the movement 
of the two men's legs. Ibid. He testified that both at that 
point, and later before Andrews left and the killings took 
place, he heard Andrews say "I can't do it, I'm scared." T. 
3092, 3183. Mr. Walker indicated Andrews "was disturbed during 
the whole evening" (T. 3176-7), that Andrews protested when 
Pierre first fired his gun (T. 3072, 3175), and that the two 
men engaged in a heated conversation in which he heard Pierre 
say "what about me being booked," before any of the victims 
were harmed. T. 3074. And Mr. Walker testified clearly that 
each of the shootings, the apparent rape of Michelle Ainsley 
and the final assaults on Mr. Walker himself, were all done by 
Pierre after Andrews had argued with him and left. See T. 
3101-13, 3188-90. 
Though concededly a jury might reach an opposite 
conclusion, the testimony of Mr. Walker surely does not compel 
a conclusion that the person identified as William Andrews 
intended to kill any of these victims. Mr. Walker's 
description of the incidents would support, at least as 
strongly, the defense theory that that man may well have had no 
intent to kill, but played only a limited and reluctant part 
-8-
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in acts he could not stop, acts which were not lethal. See T. 
4295-7. On the facts of this case--just as on the facts of 
Lockett v. Ohio, where the defendant planned the robbery, 
obtained the gun, and then hid it after the killing (438 U.S. 
590), or the facts of Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 639 (1978), 
where the defendants accused each other of committing the 
actual homicide--the evidence was susceptable to two possible 
conclusions. The jury may or may not have found against the 
defendant on the evidence, on the question of specific intent. 
The critical issue, under Justice White's opinion in 
Lockett and Bell, is whether the jury made such a finding that 
wthe defendant possessed a purpose to cause the death of the 
victim.w 438 u.s. 624. As Justice White said in Lockett, 
"there is a vast difference between permitting a factfinder to 
consider a defendant's willingness to engage in criminal 
conduct which poses a substantial risk of death in deciding 
whether to infer that he acted with a purpose to take life, and 
defining such conduct as the ultimate fact equivalent to 
possessing a purpose to kill." 438 U.S. at 627. The 
instructions given in Lockett did not require the jury to 
specify whether it found a specific intent (438 U.S. 593), and 
neither did the instructions in this case. 
Though both the majority and concurring opinions in 
this case seem to accept the principles of Justice White's 
opinion in Lockett, they erroneously assume that "the jury was 
-9-
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instructed with great care that the death penalty could be 
imposed only if the jury found that each defendant personally 
intended that one or more of the victims be killed.w 
Concurring Opinion, page 15. In fact the jury was given an 
array of instructions on the Utah "parties" rule, which fell 
far short of requiring a finding of specific intent to kill in 
order to convict. It was told that a person was a party to a 
murder if he perpetrated it himself, wintentionally helped plan 
or assisted in the advancement of the murder with intent that 
it would take place, and did not effectively withdraw before 
the killing," "intentionally rendered active advice during the 
murder, or ••• intentionally helped the murderer escape.w Instr. 
8, Pet. App. G. It was then told, somewhat inconsistently, 
that "a party to a robbery ••• is also a party to the killing 
that may occur therein, only if he knew the killing was planned 
••• or if he knows certain co-parties planned to kill if certain 
contingencies occur" (Instr. 12), and further that wonce an 
individual indulges in planning or the assisting of criminal 
conduct he is responsible for the furtherance of that criminal 
conduct unless he has effectively withdrawn" (Instr. 13). The 
prosecutor condensed this to argue that being a wparty• was 
enough: that even if a defendant "didn't actually do the 
killing himself," "if he intentionally helped plan or assisted 
in the advancement of the murder ••• and did not effectively 
withdraw ••• rendered active advice during the murder, or he 
-10-
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intentionally helped the murderer escape from the immediate 
scene of the crime, then that person • is just as guilty 
[o]f murder as the actor." T. 3815. (emphasis added). 
Under these instructions, the jury had no choice but to 
convict Petitioner Andrews of murder, once it found he was the 
person who assisted in the robbery, whether or not it believed 
he intended that any of these killings take place. Under the 
evidence in this case, it is fully possible that the jury was 
not convinced that he did. A death sentence imposed in such 
circumstances cannot be squared with the proportionality 
principles laid out in Justice White's opinion in Lockett, 
and the Court should grant a rehearing on this aspect of its 
opinion. 
3. The Court's rejection of Petitioner's claim that the 
method of execution in Utah is unconstitutional fails to 
consider the factual information Petitioner has sought to 
produce in support of his contention. 
The Court's majority opinion summarily rejects on the 
merits Petitioner's claim that "the imposition of the death 
penalty by shooting or hanging is 'cruel' and 'unusual' ,• 
Opinion, page 11, without permitting Petitioner the hearing he 
requested with which he could establish the factual claime on 
which this contention must be based. The legal authority 
Petitioner cited in support of this claim establishes only that 
a punishment is unconstitutional if it "makes no measurable 
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is 
-11-
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nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and 
suffering.• Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 584, 592 (1977). That 
legal test cannot be applied without a determination of certain 
facts, including whether a particular punishment imposes •pain 
and suffering,• and whether it makes any •contribution to 
acceptable goals of punishment.• 
The Petition in this case sought a factual hearing on 
precisely these points. Petition, page 10. On appeal, 
Petitioner specifically alleged that, if given a hearing, he 
could demonstrate that the methods of execution used in this 
state do inflict pain and suffering, and •serve no penal 
purpose but to satisfy certain doctrines of the Mormon Church." 
App. Br. 23. These contentions are not frivolous and cannot 
be rejected without a factual determination: there is a 
growing body of legal literature which concludes that hanging 
and shooting are torturous and societally unacceptable methods 
of execution, see Gardner, Executions and Indignities--An 
Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital 
Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. LAW J. 96, 119-125 (1978), and that the 
sole purpose for the institution of Utah's peculiar execution 
laws is the satisfaction of the Mormon Church Doctrines of 
"blood atonement• and election of salvation, Gardner, Illicit 
Legislative Motivation as a Sufficient Condition for 
Unconstitutionality Under the Establishment Clause--A Case for 
Consideration: The Utah Firing Squad, 1979 WASH. u. L. Q. 435. 
-12-
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Certainly, this Court cannot determine whether these 
allegations are true without examining evidence regarding the 
pain involved in death by these means, and considering 
historical evidence about their genesis and possible purposes. 
Clearly, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 u.s. 130 (1878), relied on by 
the Court, is not dispositive of this issue. In Wilkerson the 
issue was not whether death by shooting was cruel and unusual, 
but whether the trial court could validly impose such a 
sentence in the absence of statutory authority. See Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 u.s. 238, 284 n.30 (1972) (Brennan, J.). Though 
the Court in Wilkerson did go on, in dicta, to say that the 
penalty was not unconstitutional, it did so applying societal 
standards over 100 years old, and making assumptions that 
nunnecessary crueltyn was not involved in such executions (99 
u.s. 135) which the Petition here directly challenged. This 
Court should not reject that challenge without having heard it. 
-13-
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CONCLUSION 
The summary disposition of these issues has deprived the 
court of the benefit of a full evidentiary record and 
deliniation of the relevant facts, and has deprived Petitioner 
of the right to a full hearing on his factual and legal claims. 
See, e.g., Martinez v. Smith, No. 16393 (October 24, 1979). 
Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court grant him a 
rehearing, so that he can fully present his claims to this 
court, and so that the factual bases for his arguments can be 
presented in some forum before they are rejected. 
DATED: March 2, 1980. 
-14-
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